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TAX LAWYER
Net Widens
An expansive interpretation of the general anti-avoidance
provision has led to a taxpayer appealing to the Court of
First Instance
In a recent decision of the InlandRevenue Board of Review, D44/9712
IRBRD 292; (1998) HKRC §80-526, in-
volving the application of s 61A - the
general anti-avoidance provision in the
Inland Revenue Ordinance (IRO) - the
Board took an expansive view of the
provision by applying it to a company's
unilateral change of accounting dates.
The taxpayer was a property deve-
lopment company, which changed its
accounting year. Under (arcane) IRO
rules, set out in s 18E, this caused the
main portion of the taxpayer's profits
to 'drop out' of the profits tax net. (This
rule only applies to taxpayers that com-
menced business before 1 April 1974.)
The taxpayer's affairs were seem-
ingly arranged so that the property
development profits were derived
during the 'drop out' period. The Com-
missioner took the view that the
taxpayer's change of accounting date
was contrived to take advantage of
s 18E in a way which was not intended
by the legislature and which was done
simply to avoid tax on those profits.
The Commissioner assessed the tax-
payer under s 61A (1), specifically
taking the view that the taxpayer had
entered into a transaction with the sole
or dominant purpose of avoiding li-
ability for tax,
The taxpayer initially argued that
there was simply no 'transaction' (as
required by s 61A) to which the pro-
visions of s 61A could be applied. It
contended that the concept of a trans-
action required dealing between two
parties and that a mere unilateral
change of accounting date was not a
transaction. The Board rejected this
argument, holding that unilateral
actions fall within the meaning of tran-
saction for the purposes of s 61A.
The taxpayer's second argument
was that, having regard to the seven
factors set out in s 61A(1) (to which
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regard must be had to determine
whether the taxpayer had entered into
the transaction for the sole or domi-
nant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit),
it could not be concluded that the tax-
payer changed its accounting date for
that purpose. The Board held that it
was not limited to considering those
seven factors and that in appropriate
cases it could have regard to the tax-
payer's subjective intention. The Board
held that:
Application of the objective test
entails critical examination of
statements of subjective intent-
ion. If those statements are merely
self-serving statements and do
not accord with the objective
facts, application of the objective
test does not exclude consider-
ation of such statements. The
statements must of course be rel-
evant to one or other of the seven
matters specified in s 61A.
Here the Board appears to be stating
that, although it could not have regard
to the taxpayer's general subjective in-
tention to avoid tax, it could still con-
sider the taxpayer's subjective intention
in order to clarify the application of the
seven factors set out in s 61A(1).
The Board also held that applying
the seven factors is not a 'goal scoring
exercise' by which a point is assigned
to each of the criterion listed in s 61 A(l).
The Board said: 'Having regard to each
of the seven specified matters, an
overall view must be taken whether
the person carried out the transaction
for the sole or dominant purpose of
obtaining the tax benefit.' Thus, in
applying s 61A, a general impression
of the taxpayer's purpose must be
formed by applying the seven factors.
Individual factors do not necessarily
carry the same weight in every case.
The Board then proceeded to ana-
lyse how the seven factors applied to
this case. It concluded that the taxpay-
er's intention was to avoid, tax.
The taxpayer's third argument was
that the general anti-avoidance provi-
sions could not override a specific
provision of the IRO, which provided
for the method of assessment where a
taxpayer changes its accounting date.
The Board also rejected this argument,
having regard to the Privy Council's
decision in CIR v Challenge Corporation
Ltd [1987] AC 155, holding that:
What the Taxpayer did was to
engage in a contrived scheme for
the sole purpose of avoiding tax.
That scheme has no basis in the
ordinary business of the Tax-
payer. Its reliance on s 18E is tax
avoidance and not tax mitigation.
On the basis of Challenge, s 61A
is available to strike down such
contrived scheme.
The taxpayer's fourth argument re-
lated to the basis on which the IRD
was permitted to make an assessment
that extended for a period of more
than 12 months. The Board agreed
that s 18E did not permit an assessment
for a period beyond 12 months.
However, it held that s 61A expressly
authorised assessment of the taxpayer
'in such ... manner as the Assistant
Commissioner considers appropriate
to counteract the tax benefit which
would otherwise be obtained'. On this
ground, the Board rejected the
taxpayer's argument.
This decision is important because it
affirms the Board's willingness to apply
the general anti-avoidance provision
and to reject technical arguments that
would seek to limit it. The Board's com-
ments about the application of s 61A to
unilateral transactions, the relevance
of the taxpayer's subjective intention
and the relationship between s 61A
and other relief provided by the IRO
had not been considered previously by
the courts in Hong Kong.
The taxpayer has appealed the
Board's decision to the Court of First
Instance.
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